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Abstract
Weekly sales at retail stores exhibit several patterns
that the existing literature on price promotion does
not fully capture. In this paper we develop a simple
symmetric model where duopoly manufacturers
distribute competing brands through a monopoly
retailer to serve consumers with heterogeneous
reservation prices. We show that the heterogeneity in
consumers’ reservation prices coupled with the
retailer’s market power is sufficient to resolve the
deficiency in the literature. We then show that, while
pricing patterns under this model differ significantly
from those under a model where the retailer has no
market power, the manufacturers’ expected profits
are the same in both cases.
Keywords: Sales Promotion, Pricing, Game Theory

Introduction
Price promotion at both the wholesale and retail
levels is a ubiquitous phenomenon. As Raju et al.
(1990) comment, short-term discounts are one of the
major competitive weapons in the brand manager’s
arsenal. Blattberg et al. (1995) also note that
nondurable goods manufacturers spend more money
on promotion than on advertising. The most
frequently seen price promotions are probably the
weekly markdowns at grocery stores1. Table 1 below
presents a series of such promotions2.
Table 1 illustrates several prominent and
interesting patterns. First, competing brands of the
same product are featured in different promotional
periods3. That is, in a given week, at most one of the
competing brands is featured. For example, Perdue
chicken breast was advertised on sale during the
week of March 25. Then, during the week of April 1,
Tyson chicken breast replaced Perdue’s in the flyer.
1

Promotions at the wholesale level are called trade
deals or trade promotions, and promotions at the
retail level are called retail promotions. Among
various forms of sales promotions, we concentrate
solely on price cuts in this paper.
2
The data is obtained from weekly sales flyers at the
Kroger stores in Bloomington, IN. The promotional
prices listed in the flyers were typically valid for one
week.
3
This phenomenon is also noted by Lal (1990), who
attributes it to collusion between national brands.

Second, the promotional prices for the same product
are similar both across competing brands and across
different sales periods, even when the regular prices
are different. For instance, Brawny and Scott paper
towels had about a $2 difference in their regular
prices, but their sales prices were both $4.99/pack.
Third, the promotional prices represent relatively
large discounts from the corresponding regular prices.
In our sample above, we see price cuts of 30%-50%
of the regular prices. Fourth, each of the brands was
sold at the regular price more than half of the times.
These patterns naturally invite a search for
theoretical explanations. In line with the importance
of price promotion, there has been substantial
research to rationalize price promotion. Varian (1980)
shows that stores may use price promotion to exploit
information heterogeneity among consumers. Baye
and Morgan (2001) further the analysis by studying
the impact of a market for price information on retail
pricing strategies on the homogeneous product
market it serves. Along a similar line, Narasimhan
(1988) analyzes differences in consumers’ brand
loyalty and shows that firms employ mixed pricing
strategy to attract brand switchers. Agrawal (1996),
Lal and Villas-Boas (1998), Raju et al. (1990), Rao
(1991) and Simester (1997) strengthen this argument
of brand loyalty and extend it to more general
settings. Conlisk et al. (1984), Sobel (1984), and
Pesendorfer (2002), on another hand, examine price
promotion in intertemporal settings and relate it to
intertemporal price discrimination and intertemporal
demand effects.
While these existing studies cast tremendous
insights on understanding frms’ price promotion
decisions, they cannot satisfactorily account for the
patterns revealed in Table 1. In particular, models
with common reservation price, such as Varian
(1980), Lal and Villas-Boas (1996, 1998), and Baye
and Morgan (2001), predict that everything is on sale
everyday, yet the depth of sale can be any amount of
a random draw from the equilibrium price
distribution. Such predictions contradict some of the
main characteristics of weekly sales at Kroger;
namely, the alternating featuring of different brands
in different weeks, use of the same sales price for
competing brands, and deep discounts from the
regular prices. In addition, in the Kroger flyers we
observe that both of the competing brands have
positive probabilities to be priced at their regular and
promotional prices, whereas models with asymmetry
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in brand loyalty, such as Narasimhan (1988) and
Raju et al.(1990), prescribe that only the stronger
brand has a positive probability of being sold at the
regular price. Moreover, many studies in the
literature, including Varian (1980), Sobel (1984),
Narasimhan (1988), Lal (1990), Raju et al. (1990),
and Baye and De Vries (1992), abstract away from

the channel setting. But as shown by Lal and
Villas-Boas (1996, 1998) and Baye and Morgan
(2001), strategic interaction between channel
members plays an important role in their pricing
decisions.

Table 1. Price Promotions Observed in Kroger Weekly Flyers
Product
Brand
Regular Price
03/25/2004
04/01/2004
04/08/2004
04/15/2004
04/22/2004
04/29/2004

Boneless Skinless
Chicken Breast
Perdue
Tyson
$4.99/lb
$4.99/lb
$1.99/lb
Not featured
Not featured
$1.99/lb
Not featured
$1.99/lb
Not featured Not featured
$1.99/lb
Not featured
Not featured Not featured

Orange Juice
(64oz Carton)
Minute Maid
Tropicana
$3.75/carton
$3.89/carton
Not featured
Not featured
$1.99/carton
Not featured
Not featured
$1.99/carton
Not featured
Not featured
$1.99/carton
Not featured
Not featured
Not featured

In this paper, we employ a parsimonious model to
reconcile the above inconsistency between the
observed sales patterns and theory, and to also
analyze how market structure affects promotional
decisions. In our symmetric model 4 , duopoly
manufacturers distribute close substitutes through a
common monopoly retailer to serve consumers with
heterogeneous reservation prices. We show that the
heterogeneity in consumers’ reservation prices
(reservation price differential hereinafter) coupled
with the retailer’s market power is sufficient to drive
all the promotional patterns revealed in Table 1. We
show that the retailer employs pure-strategy Hi-Lo
pricing to exploit the reservation price differential,
and it only does so when the size of the low valuation
segment is large enough. The competing
manufacturers, on the other hand, use mixed
strategies in wholesale price cuts to compete for the
chances of serving low valuation consumers.
We also highlight the effects of channel structure
on sales patterns and welfare. A powerful retailer in
the channel is able to set stickier retail prices that are
not linear functions of the wholesale prices. Thus the
Hi-Lo retail pricing will not break down even when
the wholesale prices are only one penny apart5. On
4

The symmetry in our model enables us to obtain
more general results that do not rely on any
asymmetry in the competing manufacturers’ market
shares, consumers’ brand loyalty level, or relative
sizes of different consumer segments between
competing brands.
5
This finding differs from the results in Agrawal’s
(1996) study, where the Hi-Lo price equilibrium can
break down when the two manufacturers price
closely enough to each other.

8 Roll Paper Towel
Brawny
$9.45/pack
Not featured
$4.99/pack
$4.99/pack
Not featured
Not featured
Not featured

Scott
$7.29/pack
$4.99/pack
Not featured
Not featured
$4.99/pack
Not featured
Not featured

the other hand, if the retailer has no power in the
channel, pricing patterns at both the retail and
wholesale levels change significantly. There are
more price promotions and deeper discounts to
benefit the consumers, but the manufacturers’
expected profits remain the same.
Our model integrates the extant models of price
promotion with added features, which allows us to
obtain better data fitting equilibrium pricing patterns
than those predicted by the existing studies. For
example, our base model can be thought as
Narasimhan’s (1988) model with an added monopoly
retailer and with reservation price differential
between loyal consumers and brand switchers. Our
direct selling model can be thought as a general
version of Varian.s (1980) and the no-loyalty case of
Lal and Villas-Boas’s (1998) models that allow
reservation price differential6. While none of these
three models predicts a fixed promotional and/or
regular price as seen in the Kroger flyers, our model
does.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. In
Section 2, we first analyze the base model with a
powerful retailer, then deprive the retailer of channel
power and solve for the resulted equilibrium, and in
the end compare the price promotion patterns from
these two models. Section 3 concludes.

Concluding Remarks
6

There are some other extreme cases in Lal and
Villas-Boas’s (1998) study, as pointed out by one
reviewer. Most of those cases deal with size
asymmetry in consumer segments for different
manufacturers and retailers.
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In this paper we examine the incentives for price
promotion from a different perspective: the
segmentation of consumer market based on
reservation price. The results derived from our model
do not depend on brand loyalty and can be applied to
both the cases of repeatedly purchased products and
those of durable goods. The predictions of our model
are consistent with the price promotion patterns
observed at retail stores. We have also shown that (1)
heterogeneity in consumers’ reservation prices is an
important determinant of competitive price
promotion strategies, (2) differences in market
structure can result in significant differences in the
pricing patterns at both the retail and wholesale
levels, but (3) because of competition in the retail
market, changes in market structure do not
necessarily alter wholesale profitability.
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